

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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-----053678 161305Z /43

P R 161115Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8147
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 6874

EXDIS

FROM NEWSOM

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: US, PK, MNUC, TECH, PEPR
SUBJECT: UNDERSECRETARY'S MEETING WITH GENERAL ZIA

1. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR HUMMEL AND I HAD 45 MINUTES DISCUSSION WITH GENERAL ZIA, AGHA SHAHI, SHAHNAWAZ, AND GEN SHARIFF OF JOINT CHIEFS COMMITTEE JULY 16. DISCUSSION CENTERED ON PAKISTANI CONCERN OVER CLEAR SOVIET ADVANCE IN AFGHANISTAN. I REITERATED U.S. INTEREST IN PAKISTAN'S SECURITY, BUT IT WAS CLEAR REPROCESSING PLANT REMAINED OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS; GENERAL ZIA FEELS U.S. POSITION ON PLANT IS CLEARLY DISCRIMINATORY TOWARDS PAKISTAN. GENERAL ALSO TOOK OCCASION TO EXPRESS DOUBTS CONCERNING VALUE OF CENTO. END SUMMARY.

2. ZIA BEGAN BY ASKING MY IMPRESSIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, AND AT SAME TIME SAYING THE PRESENT DISCUSSION WOULD BE PRELIMINARY, AND WOULD BE CONTINUED IN ANOTHER MEETING WITH HIM JULSH17.

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3. I RESPONDED WITH BRIEF RESUME INCLUDING POINTS THAT: AN ORGANIZED PARTY WAS AT WORK THERE, THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT YET CLEAR, BUT THAT I HAD CLEARLY PUT GOA ON NOTICE THAT THE USG WOULD BE MAKING JUDGEMENTS ABOUT THEM, ACCORDING TO CRITERIA I DESCRIBED, INCLUDING THE DEGREE TO WHICH THEY WERE GENUINELY NON-ALIGNED AND ALSO RESPECTED THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF

PAKISTAN. WE BELIEVED THAT FOR TIME BEING ALL CONCERNED SHOULD TRY TO KEEP NORMAL RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN.

4. ZIA SAID THAT ATTEMPTS WERE BEING MADE TO FORGE A PAK-INDIAN-IRANIAN GROUPING TO RESIST SOV/AFGHAN PRESSURES BUT THAT COULD NOT WORK. THE RESULT OF PARCHAM-KHALQ TENSIONS ONLY SHOWED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD DECIDED THAT THE SLOWER KHALQ LINE WAS MORE EFFECTIVE AT THIS TIME THAN THE MORE EXTREME PARCHAMISTS. THERE WERE 7-8,000 SOVIETS IN THE COUNTRY. ZIA REHEARSED THE HISTORY OF THREE BRITISH WARS WITH AFGHANISTAN, IN WHICH THE AFGHANS ALWAYS WON OUT NOT BECAUSE OF THE TOUGH AND INDEPENDENT SPIRIT OF THE AFGHANS BUT BECAUSE BRITISH WISHED TO RETAIN AFGHANISTAN AS BUFFER. NOW THE SITUATION HAD CHANGED DRASTICALLY, WITH A GOVERNMENT THAT HAD THE POWER TO SUPPRESS ANY DISSIDENCE. MASSIVE SOVIET MILITARY TRAINING AND SUPPLIES SINCE 1964 HAD PAID OFF. RECENTLY THERE HAD BEEN 5 DIFFERENT AIR OPERATIONS IN DISTURBED AREAS THAT HAD EFFECTIVELY INTIMIDATED THE TRIBES. SOVIET CITIZENS IN AFGHAN CLOTHES WERE AT WORK ASSISTING THE TARAKI GOVERNMENT. PAKISTAN IS NOW THE BUFFER. THERE ARE SHARP DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THIS AND OTHER SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN EGYPT AND ELSEWHERE FROM WHICH THOSE COUNTRIES HAD MANAGED TO EXTRICATE THEMSELVES. THE SOVIETS HAD COME TO AFGHANISTAN TO STAY. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT WHEN PRES. DAUD HAD TRIED TO GET CLOSER TO THE FREE WORLD, THE U.S. HAD REFUSED TO RECEIVE HIM. PERHAPS DAUD MIGHT HAVE BEEN KILLED ANYWAY, BUT THE SECRET

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USG HAD FAILED TO GIVE SUPPORT WHEN NEEDED AND REQUESTED.

5. I SAID I FOUND HIS VIEWS INTERESTING, AND WHILE WE MIGHT DIFFER ON DETAILS SUCH AS THE NUMBER OF SOVS IN THE COUNTRY, WE CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THE DANGER TO PAKISTAN OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE USG IS CONCERNED ABOUT SOV PRESSURES AND EXPANSIONISM, AND THE USG REGARDS THE USSR AS OUR MAJOR POTENTIAL ADVERSARY. WHEN WE COUNSEL A WAIT-AND-SEE POLICY AT THIS TIME IT IS NOT BECAUSE WE UNDERESTIMATE THE PROBABLE FUTURE DANGERS BUT BECAUSE PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS COULD ACCELERATE A PROCESS OF COUNER-PRESSURES AND PRODUCE AFGHAN GOVT MOVES EVEN CLOSER TO THE SOVS.

6. I SAID I HAD COME ALSO TO TALK ABOUT US-PAKISTAN BILATERAL RELATIONS AND WOULD DO SO THE FOLLOWING DAY. THE USG WANTS TO CONTAIN

THE EFFECTS OF THE COUP IN AFGHANISTAN AND IS CONCERNED ABOUT ITS EFFECT ON PAKISTAN. THE GOP MUST BE EXAMINING ALTERNATIVES, AND WE UNDERSTAND THE GOP MIGHT MAKE OVERTURES TO THE SOVIETS AS ONE MEANS OF RELIEVING EXPECTED PRESSURES. WE ARE CERTAIN THAT IN CURRENT SITUATION PAKISTAN WOULD NOT WISH TO GIVE SOVIETS LXPRESSION THEIR TACTICS ARE SUCCESSFULLY TURNING OTHER

COUNTRIES FROM THE WEST. A WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTO UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES COULD GIVE THIS IMPRESSION. THE CENTRAL QUESTION IS HOW THE USG AND GOP CAN RESTORE OUR PREVIOUS CLOSE RELATIONS TO OUR MUTUAL BENEFIT. WE KNOW OUR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICIES CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR THE GOP BUT WE ARE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THIS POLICY WORLD-WIDE. IN VIEW OF IMMEDIATE DEFENSE PRIORITIES WE SUGGEST THE GOP MIGHT CONSIDER SUSPENSION OF WORK ON THE REPROCESSING PLANT OR ITS ULTIMATE CANCELLATION. I AM PREPARED TO DISCUSS HOW THIS MIGHT BE DONE WITH A MINIMUM OF DISRUPTION TO PAKS, AND LO TALK ABOUT ELEMENTS OF USG SUPPORT IN THAT EVENTUALITY.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 6874

EXDIS

FROM NEWSOM

7. ZIA SAID IT WAS REASSURING TO HEAR THAT THE USG STILL HAD AN INTEREST IN PAKISTAN. FROM 1954 TO 1964 THERE HAD BEEN FULL US SUPPORT OF THE MOST VALUABLE KIND, BUT SINCE THEN REVERSALS OF POLICY, AND DIFFERING ATTITUDES BETWEEN REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PARTIES IN WASHINGTON HAD CAUSED SERIOUS DOUBTS. HE SAID THAT ACCORDING TO HIS OBSERVATIONS THE USG IS NOT INTERESTED IN PAKISTAN, BUT INSTEAD WANTS TO ACHIEVE SECURITY IN THE AREA BY SUPPORTING IRAN AND INDIA INSTEAD. NEITHER OF THOSE COUNTRIES CAN OR WILL ENSURE PAKISTAN'S SECURITY. AT THE TIME OF THE AFGHAN COUP HE HAD MADE A NUMBER OF OVERTURES TO DESAI, IN WRITING AND IN AN ATTEMPT TO TELEPHONE, AND HE HAD ALSO TRIED TO ENGAGE THE SHAH IN ACTIVE SUPPORT OF PAKISTAN. NEITHER HAD PRODUCED NOTICEABLE RESULTS. THE INDIANS OWE LOYALTY TO THE SOVIETS, AS

WITNESS THE HASTE OF THEIR RECOGNITION OF THE NEW KABUL REGIME,
AND REGARDLESS OF USG ASSISTANCE TO INDIA (SIC) THEIR FIRST
PRIORITIES LIE WITH RUSSIA. DESPITE PAK PROMISES AND ASSURANCES
AND OFFERS TO INCREASE THE SAFEGUARDS ON THE FRENCH REPROCESSING
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PLANT THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE ACTION ON CONSTRUCTION. IN CONTRAST
INDIA HAD THREE UNSAFEGUARDED REPROCESSING PLANTS AND SHE GETS
UNSAFEGUARDED HEAVY WATER FROM THE US.

8. I RESPONDED THAT OUR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY APPLIES
WORLD-WIDE AND IS NOT DESIGNED TO BE DISCRIMINATORY TO PAKISTAN,
INDEED WE HAD INCURRED SEVERE BILATERAL PROBLEMS WITH BRAZIL AND
SOUTH AFRICA, AND IN INDIA WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO
SUPPLY NUCLEAR FUEL IF IN 18 MONTHS INDIA DID NOT AGREE TO
FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. PAKISTAN IS AT AN EARLIER STAGE IN
DEVELOPMENT OF REPROCESSING THAT PRODUCES PLUTONIUM, AND OUR
NON-PROLIFERATION POLICIES MUST PERFORCE BE HANDLED IN A
DIFFERENT WAY. I SAID I WAS DISTURBED AT ZIA'S CONCLUSION THAT
THEY FAVORS INDIA. WE HAVE NO MILITARY AID PROGRAM HERE AND NO
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR SOME YEARS. PAKISTAN IS AND REMAINS OF
PIVOTAL CONCERN TO THE USG IN THIS REGION. I SAID I COULD
UNDERSTAND THE ATTITUDES EXHIBITED, AND THE DISAPPOINTMENTS, BUT
IN THE SPIRIT OF PRES. CARTER'S LETTER TO ZIA WE WANT TO EXPLORE
WAYS OF BEING HELPFUL. ANY DECISION ABOUT CENTO IS UP TO THE GOP,
BUT OUR ATTITUDE IS ONE OF WANTING TO HELP PAKISTAN.

9. ZIA OUTLINED PAK DISAPPOINTMENTS WITH CENTO. I GAVE SOME OF
ITS EARLY HISTORY, INCLUDING THE REASON THE USG COULD NOT JOIN AS
A FULL MEMBER, AND REFERRED TO SECY VANCE'S DISCUSSIONS WITH
CENTO SEC GEN RECENTLY. OUR CONCERN OVER A POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL
FROM CENTO IS THE SIGNAL IT WOULD GIVE TO THE SOVIETS.

10. ZIA SAID THE SOVS HAD REPEATEDLY URGED WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTO,
AND ZIA HAD REPLIED VERY STIFFLY THAT THIS WAS PAKISTAN'S
DECISION TO MAKE. THE AFGHANS HAD ALSO URGED WITHDRAWAL. EVEN
INDIAN FONMIN HAD TOLD ZIA HE HOPED THE GOP "WOULD NOT GO TO
CENTO AND TO THE US FOR ARMS" TO MEET THE AFGHAN SITUATION.

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11. I TOLD ZIA OF MY STATEMENTS TO INDIAN OFFICIALS THAT WE WERE
HOPING TO BE ABLE TO GIVE SOME MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN
AND OF THE INDIAN OFFICIALS' ACQUIESCENCE. ZIA SAID DRILY THAT IF
THAT REPRESENTED A REAL INDIAN VIEW IT WAS A CHANGE FOR THE
BETTER.

12. AS ZIA CLOSED THE CONVERSATION IN ORDER TO JOIN THE WAITING DINNER GUESTS I REITERATED OUR CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET AIMS AND OUR DESIRE TO FIND WAYS TO SUPPORT PAKISTAN.

13. ZIA IN TOAST AT DINNER NOTED HE WOULD SPEAK FRANKLY AND CANDIDLY "AS A FRIEND AND AS A SOLDIER". HE THEN REITERATED MANY OF THE POINTS HE MADE IN OUR PRIVATE CONVERSATION, INCLUDING THE HOPE THAT AS A SUPERPOWER DEALING WITH A "SMALL STATE", WE COULD SET ASIDE OUR OBJECTION TO THE REPROCESSING PLANT, EXPECIALLY SINCE UNSAFEGUARDED PLANTS ALREADY EXIST IN INDIA AND ELSEWHERE. HE ALSO RETURNED TO THEME THAT THERE IS A GROWING PERCEPTION AMONG OUR FRIENDS THAT THE SOVIET UNION, BECAUSE OF LACK OF AMERICAN RESOLVE, CONTINUES TO MAKE GAINS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE FREE WORLD. "SUPERPOWERS MUST ACT 'SUPERPOWERLY', BUT ONLY ONE IS DOING SO."
HUMMEL

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